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A B S T R A C T
In this article, I provide an ethnographic exploration
of some of the terms for imagining knowledge in
today’s “knowledge society,” and I attempt to
situate the kind of “sociology of knowledge” behind
this imagination. In particular, I am interested in
the sociological imagination of knowledge in terms
of a relational economy, in which knowledge flows
uninterruptedly to create and shape what Yochai
Benkler has dubbed “the wealth of networks.” I
pursue this interest through an ethnography of the
production of research among humanities scholars
at Spain’s National Research Council (CSIC). For
CSIC’s human scientists, books (and other bookish
analogues, such as libraries or manuscript
collections) occupy a place of prominence in the
institutional production of research. This economy
of scholarship (between books, between people and
books, and between what books do and what
institutions and researchers imagine them to do)
finds itself at a “disproportionate” distance from the
“network economy of information” encountered in
the literature on the knowledge economy and
promoted in certain circles within CSIC. I contrast
the epistemological economies of CSIC scientists’
relational and disproportional views on research
and, ultimately, attempt to provide an
anthropological description of a contemporary
sociology of knowledge, including its analytical
categories and models. [knowledge, knowledge
economy, relations, proportionality, labor, academia]
I
n March 2007, I attended a seminar at the Spanish National Re-
search Council’s (CSIC) Institute for Knowledge Management (In-
stituto para la Gestio´n del Conocimiento [INGENIO]) on “ways of
making the social sciences and humanities valuable in CSIC.”1 The
event brought in people from all over Spain, including representa-
tives from departments of history, philology, sociology, economics, anthro-
pology, geography, linguistics, archaeology, social studies of science, and
area studies. Altogether, some 80 people attended. The occasion marked
the conclusion of a three-year-long research project carried out by INGE-
NIO exploring the potential for “knowledge transfer” and “innovation” in
the social and human sciences (SS and H).2 The spirit of the project re-
port was unabashedly positive: Despite stereotypes to the contrary, it said,
the SS and H had immense potential for promoting social and economic
change, and, in particular, for contributing toward the coming-into-being
of the “knowledge society.”
Toward the end of the event, in the last of the many question-and-answer
sessions for which time was made during the day, a historian of science
stood up and made the following comments:
We are being asked by our senior management to take a proactive
role in making our science valuable for society. I understand their
call. But I would like to make three comments in this respect:
1. I would call our seniors to take seriously to task the organization
of CSIC’s historical archives. It’s all very well to speak of “knowl-
edge transfer management,” but shouldn’t we first, for reasons
of institutional dignity, invest in organizing our own historical
archives?
2. It would be good, too, if those in the Science Culture Area [the de-
partment in charge of promoting CSIC’s activities to the media]
had some sense of the distinctiveness of our disciplinary exper-
tise: I’d rather not have to deal with urgent calls from the press to
talk about things I don’t know much about.
3. Ever since I got here, some twenty years ago, we’ve had tremen-
dous difficulties when it comes to buying books.Right now, it is
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impossible to buy books on one’s credit card (say, when
you are abroad) and then try to get a re-imbursement
from the institution.
Short of having finished this last point, the histo-
rian was rather abruptly interrupted by the meeting’s con-
vener, who noted that she had specifically asked for brief
interventions—time was running out—and that she did
not quite see the relevance for the topic under discussion
(knowledge transfer in the social sciences and humanities)
of the points raised by the historian.
After the meeting, on the train home, reflecting and
reminiscing about the day, some researchers with whom
I was traveling recalled the historian’s intervention: Many
cited his comments as indicative of the “psychother-
apeutic” nature of the event. People joked that every
time attendees grabbed the microphone, “they lit a can-
dle to the Virgin,” meaning they used the opportunity
to make public pronouncements about their own per-
sonal predicaments: They complained about not having
enough resources, needing more money, wanting more job
openings for their departments, or needing more admin-
istrative support. One researcher captured this sense of
asymmetrical power in a vivid idiom when he noted a
“disproportion” between what researchers were being asked
to do (become knowledge managers) and what their institu-
tions made available to them to carry out this task.
Some days later, while doing archival research at CSIC’s
Humanities Center, I came across the minutes of a meet-
ing held at one department in the center. My attention was
drawn to the following paragraph: “Dr. Alicia Go´mez talks
about the abduction (rapto) of books. She explains that the
books are taken by Dr. Martin Alonso when there are no
witnesses around, who keeps them for a year or more. She
complains that this makes work impossible. ‘Isn’t there a
mechanism to stop this?’, she asks” (Secretarı´a Direccio´n In-
stituto de Filologı´a 2000:4).3
The passage records a complaint by one professor that
a colleague kept books for himself, withdrawing them from
the library without permission and hoarding them in his of-
fice or home, thus, raising barriers to other people’s aca-
demic labor. The sense of paralysis that the word rapto
conjures reminded me of the train conversations. In this
indigenous usage, the term rapto captured a particular form
of affected and suspended agency: The absence of books
preempted the possibility of academic labor; without the
support and existence of books, Dr. Go´mez insinuated, hu-
man intentionality and labor are evacuated. Much like the
historian’s intimation about the asymmetrical deployment
of knowledge inside CSIC, about the ridiculousness of being
audited for knowledge when its very production is not prop-
erly funded, the declaration about the abduction of books
echoed an idea of knowledge as a regenerative organic body,
something that needs watering, agency, and laborious cul-
tivation to grow and that, in this context, finds itself con-
strained because of institutional strictures.
Within days of having noted this connection between
the singular relevance of books as abductors of agency
and the sociological imagination of CSIC as a dispropor-
tionate aesthetic, I was struck by a second analogy.4 A
friend brought to my attention a recent article in The New
Yorker magazine on Google’s Herculean project to create
the world’s online library (Toobin 2007). As reported in the
magazine, Google’s ambition is to digitize every book ever
published, currently estimated at no fewer than 32 million
volumes. Dan Clancy, chief engineer of Google’s scanning
project, summarized its complexity thus:
The real challenge is to get somebody something that
they are actually interested in, inside a book. Web sites
are part of a network, and that’s a significant part of
how we rank sites in our search—how much other sites
refer to the others. . . . Books are not part of a network.
There is a huge research challenge, to understand the
relationship between books. [Toobin 2007:33–34]
This article is about what Clancy refers to as “the rela-
tionship between books,” about the imagination that this
relationship plays in the making of contemporary knowl-
edge society and about the “sociology of knowledge” behind
this imagination. In particular, I am interested in the soci-
ological imagination of knowledge in terms of a relational
economy, in which knowledge flows uninterruptedly to cre-
ate and shape what Yochai Benkler (2006) has dubbed “the
wealth of networks.” In this context, Clancy’s point about
“the relationship between books” echoes CSIC researchers’
own insistence on the importance of books and other
bookish analogues (libraries, journals, and manuscripts,
of which more below) for producing knowledge and for
making knowledge grow: for dispensing with—for doing
without—its capacities for abduction. There are, however,
important differences “between books”: between Google’s
and CSIC’s visions of a world of book relations and of the
productivity of such relational worlds. I describe these dif-
ferences and use an ethnographic account of the institu-
tionalization of knowledge among philologists and social
scientists at Spain’s CSIC to comment on the epistemolog-
ical economies through which knowledge is made to ap-
pear demonstrably social. The “demonstrative” moment of
the social is important, and I want to underscore it be-
cause it points to the complex connections between the
public nature of science, different sociologies of knowledge,
and the political economy of a knowledge society. In the
ethnography, the production of knowledge demonstrates
itself through its absences. Building on the two vignettes
with which I opened the article, I develop an ethnographic
analysis of how disproportion and abduction mediate the
production of knowledge within CSIC and, in particular,
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how they inflect researchers’ imagination of the labor of
scholarship.
The Spanish context provides a particularly interesting
case for study because of its location outside the golden
triangle of the historical economy of academia (Britain–
United States, Germany, and France) and because of its sin-
gular history of state interventionism (from a 40-year dicta-
torship to socialist government) in the latter half of the 20th
century. With this in mind, my aim is to understand how the
SS and H create a context for their own usefulness at a mo-
ment in economic history when knowledge has become a
reigning value in market economics and when universities
and research institutions across Europe are facing mount-
ing pressures to marketize and commercialize their main
productive assets (via intellectual property rights, patents,
media appearances, etc.). What are the political and aca-
demic arguments used by Spanish academics and science
policy makers for negotiating the transformation of schol-
arship traditionally thought of as standing outside econ-
omy and industry (such as the humanities, and philology
and history, in particular) into viable market objects and
projects? In providing a descriptive answer to such a ques-
tion, this article ultimately constitutes an ethnography of
that gray and nebulous area that makes up what Philip
Mirowski has called the “surreptitious affair” (2004:5) be-
tween political economy and science theory. It is my hope
that an ethnography of such an affair will yield an anthro-
pological critique of contemporary sociology of knowledge,
including its analytical categories and descriptive models.
Productive knowledge
What makes knowledge productive? How does one
recognize—what circumstances are conducive to—the
productivity of knowledge?
Despite the overabundance of references to the advent
of a knowledge society, and to the existence of a knowledge
economy, scholars still know little about what makes knowl-
edge capital productive, and we know even less about the
interplay of economy and society in recognizing the politi-
cal purchase of knowledge. As Dominique Foray has put it,
“There is no production function that can be used to fore-
cast, even approximately, the effect that a unit of knowledge
will have on economic performance” (2006:9).
In collaboration with Paul A. David, Foray has recently
ventured to describe the economic fundamentals of the
new knowledge society (David and Foray 2003). Central
to this sociological economy, David and Foray say, is the
velocity at which knowledge is created, distributed, and
used. The technological speed at which this happens has, in
turn, enabled a revolution in technologies of organization,
prompting the establishment of “knowledge-based com-
munities” (David and Foray 2003:21) that foster the exter-
nalization of skills and information through expanding net-
works of decentralized, “online” exchanges (2003:22). These
exchanges involve designers, users, and “laypeople” on an
equal footing, thus making it almost impossible to deter-
mine the exact location and identity of an innovator. Com-
ing from different locations, backgrounds, and interests,
those who are involved in a knowledge-based community’s
network boost knowledge through “recombination, trans-
position and synergy” (David and Foray 2003:29). It is such
diffusion of the sources of innovation that also redefines
the “public space” of technological participation (cf. Barry
2001; David and Foray 2003:27). The public appears here as
an internal moment of a technological economy. The impli-
cation is that the economy carries its own democratic po-
tential within, which can be best realized if visualized and
made explicit through the application of technology. Tech-
nology, thus, awakens the democratic impulse that lies dor-
mant within the economy.
Although David and Foray speak authoritatively about
the technological and sociological changes brought about
by the revolution in information and communications tech-
nologies (ICTs), the political rhetoric about the knowledge
society remains anchored, as Peter Scott has noted, in a
“utopian vision” (2005:298) of what knowledge can do for
people. The utopia of knowledge is flawed by the duplici-
tous value of knowledge as both a commodity and a public
good (Scott 2005:299). This is a point recognized by David
and Foray, who acknowledge that the new information- and
knowledge-rich society is producing “artificial scarcities—
by achieving legally sanctioned monopolies of the use of in-
formation [via intellectual property rights]—in fields where
abundance naturally prevails, thus giving rise to an enor-
mous amount of waste” (2003:37). This rehearses a well-
known idea in economic theory about the qualities of
knowledge as an “externality” (e.g., Cornes and Sandler
1996:6).5
The idea of knowledge as an externality has led
economists to point out the similarities between the unsta-
ble nature of knowledge as a public good and the precari-
ousness that inflects the imagination of political values in
modern theories of global justice, in which the global and
the political spill over each other in complex ways, distort-
ing the capabilities of an agent to exercise agency over a
good (Kaul and Mendoza 2003; Stiglitz 1999). These theories
rehearse classical themes in economic anthropology on the
interplay between labor, agency, personhood, and value in
the makeup and organization of social life (Corsı´n Jime´nez
2003; Firth 1979; Graeber 2001; Ulin 2002). Two labor theo-
ries of knowledge in this context are worth distinguishing.
The first theory is sustained on the idea that knowledge
is the relational outcome of people’s use of it. The larger
the number of people exchanging knowledge, the greater
the chances of making the overall stock of knowledge grow.
Because of knowledge’s inclination to behave like an exter-
nality, some economists speak of a “tragedy of the public
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knowledge ‘commons’ ” (David 2000), in which any attempt
at circumscribing and appropriating knowledge—at turn-
ing knowledge into property—is seen as a likely subtrac-
tion from a future, larger stock of valuable knowledge. The
idea participates in what economists call a regime of “open
knowledge” (Dasgupta and David 1994; Foray 2006:172–
179), in which knowledge is rapidly disclosed and freely
available: The larger the stock of knowledge “out there,” the
greater the chances that people will “take it in,” use it, trans-
form it, add value to it, and return it in the guise of an overall
incremental addition. It is this model of the incremental ex-
change of knowledge that informs what Benkler (2006) calls
“the wealth of networks,” whose paradigm is the Internet’s
“networked economy of information.” I call the sociology of
knowledge that underpins this vision a “relational economy
of knowledge.”
The second sociological theory of knowledge partakes,
too, of the relational imaginary, although it is qualified by
what one might call a “sense of magnitude,” an appreciation
of the capacity to turn labor into knowledge. This mirrors
in important ways the distinction that Amartya Sen (1999)
draws between global justice and international equity, in
which what is gauged is neither the amount of knowledge
“out there” nor its velocity of circulation but the capacity
of different actors to make knowledge relevant for them-
selves and others. Indeed, the labor theory of knowledge
on which this model is built recognizes the importance
of “open knowledge” but distinguishes between labor and
agency in turning knowledge into a political asset. Whereas
ease of access to a network economy of knowledge guaran-
tees the availability of knowledge for use (agency), it says
nothing of the actor’s capability to use it productively (la-
bor). As Michel Callon has put it, “Asserting that an isolated
copy of a statement has use value is like saying that a pho-
tograph of a cigarette provides as much satisfaction as the
cigarette!” (1994:405).
Grahame Thompson’s study of the impact of ICTs on
the knowledge economy provides an interesting example
of the differences between an agency- and a labor-based
sociology of knowledge. Central to Thompson’s argument
is his contention that, despite all the rhetoric about the
importance of networking and the decentralization of
production, the e-economy remains alive because of its
adherence to old modes of production. His argument is
that, contrary to expectations, most of the new business
done by networking appears to be a technological exten-
sion of business first sanctioned by handshake agreements
(cf. Green et al. 2005). In the business-to-business sector—
which makes up 85 percent of total e-business revenues
(Thompson 2004:566)—the complexity in new production
designs brought about by ICTs seems to have promoted
a parallel increase in face-to-face contact and handshake
transactions. ICTs, therefore, complement, rather than
displace, traditional business strategies, which still require
“the continuation of proximity, the clustering of activities
where they can be controlled and monitored through hand-
shake transactions. . . . Networks continue to do their work
‘locally’ ” (Thompson 2004:566). So, networking flourishes
not on time–space compression but on clustering and
institutional aggregation. Most significantly, this involution
to clustering and the intensification of knowledge circu-
lation around circumscribed domains would appear to
represent, at some level, a return to a craft mode of pro-
duction. Thompson (2004:571) suggests that, unlike most
diagnoses of the knowledge economy, which take a
scientific–technological revolution as their organizing
paradigm, networking enables reorganization of produc-
tion around an engineer-based paradigm, in which tacit
knowledge and craftsmanship emerge as all important.
This is a mode of production, then, in which what is
recognized as paradigm shifting is engineers’ capacity to
put knowledge to work rather than the simple availability
of knowledge.
Thompson’s argument has significant implications
for the organization of production in universities, which
he himself spells out. Against the current of intensified,
engineer-based changes in the organization of production,
universities seem unique in having embraced the knowl-
edge economy to its letter. Increasingly, universities are
networking their operations, moving closer to flexible spe-
cialization modes of production (Slaughter and Rhoades
2004). A well-known example is the distinction made be-
tween teaching and research staff, which often entails sub-
contracting teaching activities to graduate assistants. This is
most odd, in Thompson’s (2004:574) view, because univer-
sities, in their traditional guild form of organization, were
best suited to profit from the clustering and intensifica-
tion of tacit knowledge that the new focus on craftsmanship
seems, in fact, to promote.
Productive demonstrations of knowledge
The comparison that Thompson draws between flexible
and engineer-based modes of organizing the production
of knowledge throws up interesting questions when one
thinks seriously about the kinds of knowledge that universi-
ties produce. Universities are peculiar institutions. They are
both producers (through research) and destroyers (through
teaching) of social capital (Fuller 2003a:108), and this ten-
sion is widely recognized today as an index of the social
democratic imagination (Habermas 1970; Readings 1996).
For Gerard Delanty (2001), for instance, the critically con-
structive and destructive project of the university partakes
of the longer historical tradition of modernity, which the
university has contributed to by promoting the institutional
reconciliation of alternative conceptions of knowledge as,
at times, a scientific venture, at times, a cultural project
in democracy, a historical project aimed at defining and
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embedding a space of critical and communicative reflection
in society.
Many of the struggles over the project of modernity, in-
cluding national projects of political economy, have been
fought inside universities. It is in this sense that Steve Fuller
(2003b:230) speaks of British, French, and German mod-
els of university education, each carrying its own produc-
tive economy: based on “rent” (of reputation) in the British
case, profit (from contracts) in the French case, and wage
(from work) in the German case. The political economy of
knowledge thus describes how knowledge “appears” in so-
ciety, for what purpose and effect. Not coincidentally, Fuller
(2003a:112) suggests elsewhere, what counts as knowledge
varies in terms of its location within a political economy, ex-
pertise, credentials, and intellectual property being approx-
imate indicators of the social structure—German, French,
and British—behind different classes of knowledge.
What I find intriguing about Fuller’s analyses of the po-
litical economies of knowledge is his insistence that dif-
ferent modes of producing knowledge (rent, profit, and
wage) yield different modes of productivity (intellectual
property rights, credentials, and expertise). Building on the
work of Werner Sombart, Fuller summarizes this connec-
tion with a poignant question: “How [do] producers [cap-
italists, academics] publicly demonstrate their productiv-
ity?” (2003a:116, emphasis added). My interest here is in
what Fuller calls the “demonstrative” aspect of knowledge,
that is, the dimension of production through which knowl-
edge creates its own aesthetic effects. Echoing a distinc-
tion first made by Aristotle, Jose´ Ortega y Gasset (1992:178)
once differentiated between “demonstration” (in the origi-
nal Greek, deıˆxis) and “monstration” (apodeıˆxis): a second-
order proof versus a first-order appearance. Reality, Ortega
y Gasset held, manifests itself, “appears,” in a sort of emer-
gent mode, an appearance that is “pure exhibition,” pure
spectacle (1992:179; cf. Strathern 1991:101–102). The differ-
ence between the deictic and the apodictic, then, lies in
mode of appearance: Whereas the former requires a con-
text to convey its meaning, the latter emerges simply as its
own epistemological context-in-action. In this guise, one
may profitably use Ortega y Gasset’s distinction to lend an
inflection to Fuller’s question: How does academic knowl-
edge “appear” productive? What do academics do when
they “do” knowledge?
The sociology of knowledge has generally been con-
cerned with the demonstrative at the expense of the mon-
strative, if only because perhaps the latter emerges in an
ethnographic tempo difficult to apprehend with a socio-
logical vocabulary. Letting things transpire their own apo-
dictic qualities is difficult; one is always urgently tempted
to locate them in a deictic context. This, I think, is why
Fuller (2003a:116) needs to write the spectacular dimen-
sion of productivity back into an economic mode of pro-
duction: why the productivity of knowledge is linked back to
what he calls “third-order” capitalism. Third-order capital-
ism stands in this context for reflexive capitalism (cf. Thrift
2006), a mode of production in which consumption per se
no longer indexes one’s productivity, in which consumption
is no longer the vanguard of history (cf. Miller 1995). In-
stead, under conditions of third-order capitalism, produc-
tivity is signaled by the consumption of knowledge as an
economic good. Knowledge is the new vanguard of history,
the point at which society demonstrates itself as economy.
Antiquarianism
Given the background sketched above, how, in fact, do hu-
man and social scientists working at Spain’s CSIC encounter
and redescribe to themselves the production of knowledge?
How do they demonstrate to themselves that what they
“do” is knowledge, and what larger political and sociologi-
cal economy do they face in this process of recognition?
I arrived at CSIC in June 2006 to do an ethnography of
public knowledge, of the ways in which the SS and H pro-
duce knowledge in the Spanish context, at a time when the
organization of state science in Spain was undergoing a pro-
found transformation.
Arriving in CSIC, I was assigned a research space at
the Institute of Philology, located within the Center of Hu-
manities in Madrid (CHM). I was given complete freedom
to move about the institution, which I did. The CHM is
made up of three institutes, philology, history, and Span-
ish language, which are made up, in turn, by a variety of
academic departments and employ some 200 people, both
staff and faculty. The Institute of Philology, for instance, is
made up of the Departments of Biblical Philology and Ori-
ental Antiquity, Hebrew and Sephardic Studies, Arabic Stud-
ies, and Latin and Greek Philology. I first took residence in
Biblical philology (which had 28 members, including doc-
toral and postdoctoral fellows), where I stayed for approx-
imately six months (September 2006–March 2007), and I
then moved to the Department of the History of Science
(16 members) within the Institute of History. I also moved
at leisure around other areas in the CHM and CSIC at large,
attending meetings and interviewing academics.
My arrival in CSIC coincided with an important mo-
ment of organizational change in the institution, referred
to by the authorities as the most significant in the history
of the council’s SS and H. This involved the establishment
and organization of a new Center for Human and Social
Sciences (CCHS) in Madrid, which was to bring together
in a single site most of CSIC’s SS and H departments. De-
ferred and postponed a number of times, the move finally
took place in October–November 2007. The new center is
based in a new, so-called intelligent building on the out-
skirts of Madrid. Approximately 650 people moved to the
new building, coming from a diversity of academic sites
and geographical locations in Madrid, some leaving behind
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privileged residences in the financial and political districts,
next to congress, the banking sector, or boutique shopping
areas. The decision to set up CCHS was taken in the year
2000, and to this day CSIC has invested €25 million in
the project (Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cient´ıficas
2007:3).
In many respects, the new center exemplifies what
Helga Nowotny and colleagues (2001) have famously called
a site of “Mode 2 knowledge”: a research space dedi-
cated to the production of socially robust science, that
is, Science developed in partnership and association with
Society. In this vein, the strategic plan for the new
center defines its mission as that of “producing and
transferring research results in the social sciences and hu-
manities in order to help create a knowledge society” (Con-
sejo Superior de Investigaciones Cient´ıficas 2007:5). To this
effect, the center will promote the development of “multi-
disciplinary” and “transverse” research programs that will
contribute toward “dynamizing the Spanish national sys-
tem of research and development” (Consejo Superior de In-
vestigaciones Cient´ıficas 2007:5). The INGENIO seminar on
knowledge-transfer in the SS and H, with which I opened
this article, inserts itself into this programmatic vision of
a new sociological role for science. Central to the cross-
fertilization of the sciences and society implied in this
vision is the imagination of the center as a “totally new sci-
entific structure. . . . The Centre is not the outcome of a fu-
sion between pre-existing Institutes, nor a confederation of
such Institutes. Its organisational model respects such Insti-
tutes but will integrate them in a new framework” (Consejo
Superior de Investigaciones Cient´ıficas 2007:6). This frame-
work responded to a vision of senior management to use the
creation of CCHS as an opportunity to restructure the aca-
demic organization of the SS and H within CSIC. The idea
was to put right a long history of neglect and marginaliza-
tion of the SS and H within CSIC, a situation compounded
by the SS and H’s own poor record (acknowledged by re-
searchers themselves) of international recognition.
Perhaps predictably, the integration of institutes was
not generally welcomed by academics. Among other
changes, the integration entailed the dissolution of aca-
demic departments and the invitation to researchers to
associate anew into so-called research groups. Many be-
moaned this as disrespectful to “historical identities” and
correspondingly resisted it. Once summoned, the question
of identities conjured a phantasmagoria of filiations. Philol-
ogists were often blamed, and regularly singled out, for their
“antiquarianism.” A senior social scientist, member of the
council’s Scientific Commission, spelled this out with furi-
ous irreverence:
The people in Medinaceli [the name given to the build-
ing that hosts the Center of Humanities] are essayists
and archivists. They behave like antiquarians. Philolo-
gists are obsessed with accumulating papers that no-
body knows what use they have. I suppose someday
they will serve some purpose. But then again the build-
ing itself is most apposite for their enterprises. [The
building dates to the 19th century.] They roam its cor-
ridors trafficking in rumors and gossip. A perfect exam-
ple of an environment casposo and rancio, charged with
the air of a National-Catholic bureaucracy. How can
anyone feel attachment to such place? But of course
there is the question of history and identity: don’t even
think of changing their names. Or their books. Fucking
obsession with books. Take the new library in the new
Centre: who needs a gigantic library in the knowledge
society? Why go down to the library if you can access it
online from your office computer?6
The reference to the National–Catholic bureaucracy
startled me when I first heard it, but it was soon to re-
veal itself as an important organizing trope in the imagi-
nation of the politics of knowledge inside CSIC. Although
important subtleties distinguished people’s political views,
the dominant partisan division within the institution was
that of “right-” and “left-wingers.” Whenever I recounted to
my colleagues in philology or history of science a story I had
heard elsewhere, they would often respond by saying, “Oh,
but now you need the left-wingers’ point of view” or vice
versa.
Briefly put, the views of right-wingers were strongly as-
sociated with the history of CSIC during Francisco Franco’s
dictatorship. For those critical of this tradition, the associa-
tion summoned images of a corporation dominated by “pa-
triarchal families” or “mafias,” as some people occasionally
put it, an academic aristocracy that controlled the alloca-
tion of resources, especially of plazas (new vacancies) and
that insisted on reproducing its own apparatus of research.
It published in in-house journals, organized its own con-
ferences, and promoted research agendas that proved the
importance of historical continuity in the development of
scholarship. It did this by extolling connections with the sa-
vants of Spanish academia: members of the Real Academia
de la Lengua (Royal Academy of the Spanish Language) and
the Real Academia de Ciencias Pol´ıticas y Morales (Royal
Academy of Moral and Political Sciences) or emeritus uni-
versity professors who were at the height of their powers
during the Franco regime and still sat on the council boards
of funding bodies, foundations, or even financial institu-
tions. Left-wingers, by contrast, were occasionally spoken of
as “enamored of the JAE” (the Junta de Ampliacio´n de Estu-
dios [Higher Studies Board]), which was CSIC’s institutional
forebear. Their connections outside academia were to in-
stitutions of much more recent provenance: trade unions;
publishing houses with a history of repression during the
Franco years and that only went public after 1975; literati
and intellectuals who had made an explicit effort to de-
marcate themselves from official academic culture; or, more
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recently, and especially among younger scholars, experi-
mental art–technology networks. Left-wingers’ imagination
of CSIC’s historical genealogy thus strove to “jump over” a
40-year gap (1936–75), creating a link between the demo-
cratic impulse of the pre–civil war Spanish republic and cur-
rent concerns with the governance of science in the age of
the networked economy of knowledge. Some people spoke,
too, of a third group, the “pragmatists,” described as cur-
rently in senior managerial positions and having a natural
sciences background.
In everyday conversations, the historical genealogy
of CSIC assumed contemporary inflections, in line with
Spanish current affairs. At the time of my research, the
Spanish government had promoted a Ley de la Memoria
Histo´rica (Bill of Historical Memory), aimed at recuperating
the memory of the victims of the civil war (1936–39). Some
people inside CSIC joked that the council was in the pro-
cess of passing its own Bill of Historical Memory, in allusion
to the commemoration of JAE’s 100th anniversary (1907–
2007). The point, however, was not always taken lightly. For
some, the need to link up with the spirit of the JAE years was
indispensable, for the JAE was taken as a symbol of the cul-
tural prosperity enjoyed by the Spanish republic in the years
preceding the civil war. The commemorations were seen as
a first step toward rewriting the history of CSIC, recover-
ing the JAE legacy, and helping initiate a “purge that will
cleanse the institution of its dictatorial and authoritarian
elements,” as one researcher put it in unusually dramatic
terms.
The narratives of political self-consciousness through
which researchers described the history and genealogy of
the institution correlated in interesting ways with the “his-
torical identities” of academic departments, and, in par-
ticular with local, departmental imaginaries of productive
forms of scholarship. Human scientists, for instance, were
often singled out for their antiquarianism, as the senior so-
cial scientist quoted above makes explicit. Within the hu-
manities, philologists and language theorists were favorite
recipients of such accusations, although they, too, created
their own intramural divisions. At the time of my arrival,
for instance, inside philology a fierce battle waged over the
future name of the institute, which a majority vote had
proposed to change from the Institute of Philology to the
Institute of Cultural Studies of the Mediterranean. Those
who resisted the change saw dropping the word philology
from the name of the institute as an irretrievable loss of
identity. For these scholars, their identification as philolo-
gists marked their belonging to a historical school of classi-
cal Spanish philological work. “It’s not a matter of words,”
I overheard a professor of philology tell a colleague on the
way out of a meeting, “it’s a matter of historical knowledge.”
A matter of words or not, the director of the new CCHS de-
cided to include a semantic word analysis in the center’s
strategic plan. This consisted, as he explained to me, “in
tagging each research group’s academic interests: we put a
tag to each thematic line of research, much like del.icio.us
[the website] does to create hierarchies of words. So words
that are tagged often appear in very BIG font sizes, whilst
those that are less frequent are not as visible.” It turned
out that both PHILOLOGY and HISTORY scored very highly
in the analysis. Notwithstanding, philologists remained un-
convinced that a “word game” would reproportion what
they saw as the miniaturization of their historical scholar-
ship vis-a`-vis the new economy of knowledge.
An interesting point of entry into philologists’ imagi-
nation of knowledge in terms of a reproportioning of ge-
nealogy and institutional histories and economies is the de-
bate surrounding the organization of the library at the new
CCHS. The new center is to host what people refer to as Eu-
rope’s largest library in SS and H, and this became a stick-
ing point in philologists’ reactions to the move to the new
building and the reorganization of the center. Almost ev-
ery philologist I met, at some point in our conversations,
made a reference to the new library. “Our present library,”
one philologist told me, “is very good. It has many journal
collections, many of them complete, some going back to the
19th century. Libraries are very important for us.” He added,
“Sometimes we speak of ourselves as ‘library rats.’ But it is
true: we work with cards and texts. Our work is very different
from that of historians, or anthropologists, who love field-
work. We work slowly, with texts.” “Books,” another philolo-
gist told me, “condense our economies of knowledge. We in-
scribe our thoughts in them, in annotations on the margins,
where we make our own translations of ancient words that
have no dictionary entries; likewise, we read the thoughts
that others wrote in them. Books carry our personal rela-
tions within.”7 The place of the personal in the economy of
philological scholarship was true in another sense, because
the books that one was working on (translating or annotat-
ing) were often taken as an index of which colleagues one
was working with—an inflection that placed books, and li-
braries, amidst the context of political and epistemological
battles between researchers.
The place of texts in the organization of the new li-
brary drew the attention of philologists in other ways. In
April 2007, the staff of the Institute of Philology convoked
a faculty board to discuss with the head of the new li-
brary the importance of a bibliographic organization fit
for philological work. Many people were concerned be-
cause they had heard that many of the texts and collec-
tions they worked with, especially 19th-century books, were
being moved to the library’s deposit collection, still avail-
able for loan but not on an open-shelf regime. A respected
professor approached the matter in an interesting way. He
had heard that the library staff had produced lists of most-
requested books using checkout-counter statistics and that
these lists had been used to decide which books were going
into deposit and which into open-shelf collections. He was
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worried because the books most used by philologists were
those they had in their offices, on loan from the library
for periods of a year or more. Philologists’ use of books
was, therefore, not visible to librarians because the schol-
ars rarely made requests at library counters. The professor
and those attending the meeting were finally assured by the
head librarian that books in the deposit collection would
be loaned without due-back dates: “You will still be able to
keep the books in your offices,” she affirmed.
The insistence by philologists that books dwell in their
offices echoes the vignette on the abduction of books that
I presented earlier in this article: In both cases, the impor-
tance of the material proximity of books for philological re-
search emerged as central to the imagination of produc-
tive work. This was true in other ways. The meeting with
the head librarian that I have reported was originally con-
vened because of concern among philologists about the fu-
ture of the reference rooms (salas de referencia) that each
department had in the old Medinaceli building. These were
very spacious rooms, equipped with desks, file cabinets,
and computers, used by departments to accommodate vis-
iting professors and doctoral and postdoctoral students. But
the rooms were also used to hold departmental reference li-
braries, which sometimes, as in the case of anthropology,
amounted to no fewer than 7,000 volumes. The new build-
ing contained no space for such rooms, a matter that agi-
tated researchers considerably. During the discussion with
the head librarian, much was made about the structural im-
portance of such rooms: For philologists, these rooms pro-
vided space for organizing collections according to their
own internal principles, not those of librarians. These were
philological libraries, not bibliothecary ones: libraries orga-
nized by philologists, not by librarians. The librarian admit-
ted to this divergence in structural principles of organiza-
tion. She had been promoted to the new library job from a
librarian position at the Institute of Philology, so she knew
her audience well. She, thus, conceded the point in a gentle
way:
You have to keep in mind that we are moving into a
building and a library organized according to 21st cen-
tury principles. We worked together here in Philology in
a way that won’t be easy to replicate in the new library. I
worked with you personally, to build up a library based
on your research habits. I know that you have a particu-
lar relation with books, that you move between books,
consulting annotations or quotations. This is unlikely
to happen in the new library. But you won’t be worse
off. We will work on creating new habits, new sets of re-
lationships between books.
The librarian’s comments about the structural organi-
zation of the new library, about the relationships between
books, echo Clancy’s imagination of a Google-led world of
scholarship. “Books,” Clancy observed, “are not part of a
network.” The real challenge for Google, he added, is to es-
tablish this network, to create a relational economy of books
(Toobin 2007:33–34).
As intimated above, philologists would not accede to
this vision. The way philological work makes series of books
cohere into a structural order is a case in point. The key
word here is structure. For philologists, a relational order of
scholarship characterized by the horizontal connectivity of
a network of information is far from proving that an econ-
omy of knowledge is in place. Books relate to other books
productively only when they belong to a structural econ-
omy, whose internal coherence responds to principles of or-
ganization borne out by a lifetime program of research. This
is a sort of antiquarian economy of knowledge, in which
books’ relations to other books respond to a cultivated tra-
jectory of historical scholarship and research, and in which
the principle that cements the organic growth of knowledge
is a sense of continuity. This principle of continuity was
most lucidly explained to me by the head librarian as “an
absence of absences.” The head librarian had a philological
background herself and, as noted above, had spent much of
her bibliothecary life working with philologists. In an inter-
view, she described philologists’ mode of work in the follow-
ing terms:
Philologists need to surround themselves with a struc-
tural, physical base of scholarship. This consists of a
basic corpus of reference works, which they need to
have at arm’s length for consultation. They might not
necessarily be working on those texts now, but they
know they are there for them to pull out at their con-
venience. Not all books are reference works. Some hold
books they have never read in their entirety; they may
have read about them in a footnote, or know of their
significance through indirect sources. The point is that
this structure makes up a safe haven, a close environ-
ment where they feel their work can proceed securely.
They only realize the virtues of an online library cat-
alogue when they come across a reference that they
do not hold in their personal libraries. It is such void
that prompts them to come to us. We are summoned to
make up for an absence.
Philologists’ sociology of knowledge approximates
what one might call, for want of a better term, a “sociol-
ogy of research,” if not, in fact, a complex epistemological
economy. For philologists, the structure of a collection is
intimately connected to the social structure of research, in
which the images of continuity and absence inflect their ge-
nealogical sense of scholarship. Let me explain.
At the aforementioned meeting between the philolo-
gists and the librarian, the librarian noted that the new li-
brary would assemble books from a variety of collections
and libraries, including books currently in researchers’ of-
fices. Thus, a collection hitherto found within one structure
236
Relations and disproportions  American Ethnologist
in an institute’s library might find itself dispersed into dif-
ferent structural locations in the new library. Researchers
responded by asking whether it would not make more sense
to keep philology’s library intact as a unitary structure, mov-
ing it as a whole to the new library. Some even asked about
particular volumes: They wondered whether it would not be
possible for certain titles that they knew had been destined
for a depositary location in the new library to be placed
in the open-shelf regime. The librarian remained adamant:
The new library would provide a bibliothecary structure for
the collections of eight former institute libraries; the se-
ries of no collection could be prioritized. In a precaution-
ary move, anticipating a possible discussion about biblio-
thecary rationalities and structures, she hastened to add
that the principles for organizing the new library had in fact
been approved by a library Scientific Committee in 2002,
a committee that included representatives from all depart-
ments and disciplines, including philology.
Mention of the Scientific Committee suddenly sparked
a debate that was taken outside to the corridors and that
lasted for several days. The philology department represen-
tative on the Scientific Committee recounted the story of
the committee: It had been steered from above by senior
management to produce a series of recommendations and
reports that did not reflect the interests of researchers. Six of
the eight staff representatives felt that their views had been
constantly ignored by management, and they subsequently
renounced their committee positions. But this made no dif-
ference. Management was tired of feasibility reports piling
up like autumn leaves. Someone had to give way if an “ac-
tion plan” for the new library was to be designed. A final
report, incorporating some elements of dissent yet writ-
ten without consultation, was produced and given the go-
ahead by management.
The episode was quickly incorporated into the folklore
of the institution. People spoke of the incident as “business
as usual” or “always the same story,” a story of continuous
misrepresentation of the interests of humanities scholars by
management. Some linked it to the question of historical
identities. They recalled the way researchers’ opinions had
been belittled in the selection of a name for the new library:
“They have eroded our past,” a researcher said. “If they truly
cared about the social visibility of the humanities, why not
name the library after Mene´ndez Pidal [a classical figure in
early 20th-century Spanish philology], for instance?”
The politics of misrepresentation is especially poignant
in an institution with an overrepresentation of decision-
making forums, a point made by researchers themselves;
“we spend our time in meetings” was a favorite complaint.
The failure of representative politics inside CSIC was also
spoken of in terms of “contradiction.” I heard researchers
commonly complain that “one day we are told one thing,
the following day we are told something different.” The fail-
ure to name the library after Mene´ndez Pidal was also in-
terpreted as a contradiction: “I just don’t get why the li-
brary should be named after Toma´s Navarro Toma´s [an-
other 1930s philologist], unless, of course, it is because he
was in exile and an original member of the JAE. But his
name is unknown to most people, and certainly not a ban-
ner of social visibility. It’s just a sheer contradiction.”
This is the social structure of research to which I
referred above: an institutional imaginary of meetings,
decision-making forums, and political spaces and narra-
tives that inflects the way researchers conceive of their own
production activities. The professor who complained about
the lack of respect for the institution’s own historical iden-
tity when considering a name for the new library provided
a succinct and ghostly image to this structure. Commenting
on the disappearance of philology’s library and the role of
the Scientific Committee, he said:
Nobody knows where decisions come from. You want
to appeal to the content of a decision and you are
told that it was made by a Scientific Committee. “Don’t
blame us,” they say, “your peers made the decision.”
But it turns out that my peers resigned their duties,
thus discrediting the Committee. Doesn’t matter. Sci-
ence evaporates as it travels. The only thing we are left
with is a hollow architecture of decision-making pro-
cesses. Like that film by Lars von Triers, The Boss of It
All. Have you seen it? Of an actor who is hired to act
as if he was the boss of a firm. So all decisions go to
him, but of course he knows nothing about the busi-
ness, so eventually he too has to invent a fictitious boss,
who lives abroad, and whom he responds to. Decisions
displace decisions, and nobody knows where decisions
come from.
Not knowing where decisions come from is another
way of saying that jumps occur in the steps that institutions
take in their decision-making processes. These voids cap-
ture moments of absence and suspension, like the decision
to give a library a name that has no relevant link to the insti-
tution’s past. A gap opens up between where things come
from and where they are going to, within which the very
possibility of (historical) relationality disappears.
Abduction and disproportion
In the paragraph on the abduction of books, I chose to
translate the word rapto as abduction (vs. rapture or kidnap)
for its analytical echoes of a recent body of work in stud-
ies of material culture. I refer to Alfred Gell’s (1998) famous
use of the concept of “abduction” to describe the concep-
tual means through which art objects extract meaning from
the vicinity of social relationships in which they are located.
For Gell, who follows Umberto Eco and Charles Peirce in the
use of the term, abduction involves the cognitive and index-
ical process through which material objects are caught up
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in a structure of retentions and protensions that eventually
sets them apart as distributors of agency themselves. Ab-
duction signals the moment when an intellectual and con-
ceptual inference is established through which the artifact
becomes a distributed extension of the human: It is a mode
of interpretation that brings the object to (social) life.
The use of the model of abduction has been rightly crit-
icized because how objects can exercise agency in terms
coterminous to those of persons remains unclear (Layton
2003). I do not intend to elaborate a theory of material
agency here. But I do comment on the agency of persons
and books, that is, on the relationship of academic work
and labor to academic knowledge and research that I think
is illuminated by the ethnographic descriptions above. This
relationship has two moments. The first I have called “ab-
duction.” This is represented by the suspension of agency
provoked by the nonavailability of books. It entails a real-
ization that a gap exists between agency and knowledge.
Whereas in Gell’s model, abduction provides an inferential
framework to describe extensions of agency to material ob-
jects, no doubt the process of extension may also be seen
as a process of evacuation, in which the potential for the
object’s agency evacuates one’s capacities for action in the
present. For philologists, books as material sources of pro-
ductive knowledge were capable of evacuating their per-
sonal capacities of production, as indeed happened.
The second moment situates the process of abduction
in a larger epistemological economy, a social structure of
agency that is also made apparent by its absences. The dis-
cussions surrounding the political machinations behind the
library’s Scientific Committee are an example of this sec-
ond moment. The prevalent imagery for describing this mo-
ment was that of what I call “disproportion,” which pointed
to the abyss that opened between institutional demands
and personal conditions and possibilities for action. Other
idioms for imagining this gap were those of a ghostly or his-
torically hollowed agency. Here, academic labor is brought
to a halt, or is severely constrained, by an economy of
knowledge that sets disproportionate, almost gigantic de-
mands on it. An example is the way managerial decisions
create generational and genealogical vacuums in which the
relationship between knowledge and scholarship, history
and agency, labor and research collapses, opening up a gi-
gantic space of incommensurable expectations.
Another example is the way the economies of scale of
the new library made the reference rooms look like anti-
quarian economies of knowledge. Here the personal capac-
ity to produce knowledge was miniaturized against a re-
lational economy of self-proliferating and self-aggrandized
knowledge. The head librarian spoke of the new library in
terms analogous to those of the member of the council’s
Scientific Commission: a 21st-century archive empowered
by the technological capacities of hyperlinked, online com-
munications. The possibilities afforded by the digitalization
of knowledge of such an archival project entails a serious re-
dimensioning of the very nature of knowledge as an episte-
mological object. Mike Featherstone and Couze Venn (2006)
have attributed this need to a new serendipity of knowledge,
which builds on the nonlinear, hyperlinked qualities of dig-
ital networks. The ramifying nature of such knowledge, ex-
tensional and autopoietic, almost vital (Featherstone and
Venn 2006:10–11), is not without its problems, however.
Featherstone and Venn observe that
such an archive would make problematic existing
scholarly classification, and usher in a de-classificatory
mood. The question arises whether we are at a partic-
ular historical juncture at which the speed of knowl-
edge delivery systems through digitalization is extend-
ing the de-classificatory attitude . . . flows and flux out-
pace classifications and our old typological model of
theorizing. [2006:5]
The question of the classification of knowledge would
ring a bell for philologists, whose ideas on classification are
profoundly dependant on a social structure of research in
which what is at stake is not the relational order of knowl-
edge (hyperlinked, networked, or nonlinear) but the very
types of relations that link agency to knowledge, labor to
books. As philologists would put it, what orders of knowl-
edge does a (virtual, abstract, immaterial) relation describe?
That “relationality” is a mode of description that can
take different forms is brought to light by the examples
of “abduction” and “disproportionality” depicted above. In
a sense, these are concepts that do even more concep-
tual work than relations do, because they both point to
their own absences and negative potentials: They are re-
lations that absorb the nonrelational. Abduction and dis-
proportion are descriptions of the relational and, in this
sense, evocative of orders of knowledge larger than the re-
lational itself. They are what Spanish philosopher Eugenio
Trı´as would call “limit holders”: concepts that stand on the
verge of their own ontology, capturing their own recursive
potential (Corsı´n Jime´nez and Willerslev 2007). Abduction
and disproportionality point to a theory of communicative
agency (between humans and nonhuman persons and ob-
jects) that requires an appreciation of its own negativity to
fully capture the ways in which knowledge and understand-
ing are mobilized. The image of the disproportionate puts
this in a particularly vivid idiom: how people sometimes
measure their own capacities for action not in terms of re-
lational efficacy but as the fragile realization of an obverse
potential, an evacuated potential that only becomes salient
and jumps into being because it is recognized as the an-
tithesis of the gigantic (Weiner 2001:163–164). The point,
simply, is that some things cannot be known because they
are not out there for people to relate to. Instead, they be-
come apparent by omission, through their absences. Thus,
238
Relations and disproportions  American Ethnologist
insofar as some people speak of knowledge as something
valuable because of its capacity to produce relational effects
(say, communicative agency or a market price), a case can
also be made about a type of knowledge whose efficacy lies
not in its effects but in its moments of origination, that is,
that demonstrates nothing except its own epistemological
context in action.
Conclusion
Disproportionality is a metaphor that does not chime well
with philosophical, and managerial, explanations of how
science ought to work. As Mirowski (2004) has insistently
argued throughout his work, the prevalent metaphorical
vision of explanation in the philosophy and sociology of
science in the 20th century has been that of geometrical
equilibrium. As an aesthetic of structural proportionality,
the metaphor of equilibrium has long functioned as “the
primary [locus] for the mathematization” of natural sci-
ence (Mirowski 2004:338), especially in physics, from which
it has permeated the scientific aspirations of economics
(Mirowski 1989). Classical political economy inherited this
mathematical imagination of proportionality as a figure
of stability and value, most famously in the development of
the laws of supply and demand as integral to the project of
neoclassical economics (Mirowski 2004:339).
For Mirowski, the new economics of science, of which
the globalization of privatized science is the paradigmatic
expression, retains the candid vision of a proportional aes-
thetic. He calls it “ ‘an effortless economy of science’—
modern science as a set of self-sufficient and efficient social
structures . . . patterned upon the neoclassical image of the
market” (Mirowski 2004:11). The underlying social structure
here is a frictionless plane, on which social interventions,
whether economic, political, or scientific, interact smoothly
and efficiently and eventually gravitate toward an equilib-
rium resting place, obtained by consensus and evidence-
based rationality. This is also, of course, the model of the
“open society” (Popper 1945) and the model, too, of the
“republic of science” (Polanyi 1962), in which the political
structures of science are essentially value free and transpar-
ent and all that is required of scientists and legislators is to
provide structures of governance that consolidate and repli-
cate an idea of science as a democratic good in itself. This is
also the context in which the metaphorical power of propor-
tionality becomes a sociological surrogate for theories of so-
cial democracy and political justice (Corsı´n Jime´nez 2007b);
in which science and scientific knowledge are imagined as
political objects that can be “well-ordered” (Kitcher 2001).
The use of a proportional aesthetic to imagine the rise
of the knowledge economy, and to conceptualize the place
of knowledge in sociology, has a historical sociology of its
own. As Simon Schaffer (1994) has shown, the rise of in-
telligence as an object of political economy is closely re-
lated to the philosophy of machinery that took over the
technological imagination of labor at the turn of the 18th
century. Hand in hand with the rise of Ricardian politi-
cal economy, a debate arose in which what was at stake
was the very location or “geography of intelligence” (Shaf-
fer 1994:223). Whereas philosophers of manufacturing ar-
gued that “the surplus value extracted from the machines
was the product of the intelligence of capital made real in
the force of steam-driven engines,” socialists held that the
factory system “used, and assumed, the image of the human
body as ‘living machinery’ ” (Shaffer 1994:223). Philoso-
phers of machinery provided in this context a rationalistic
account of what was otherwise a battle—between the visi-
bility or invisibility of machine versus labor intelligence—
whose larger political context was famously redescribed by
Edward P. Thompson in his account of the conflicts over
the Corn Laws and the transition from a “moral economy
of the crowd” to the “political economy of the free market”
(1971:128).
The image of a balancing of forces between the hu-
man and the machine, the visibility and invisibility of
intelligence–knowledge, and the conflict between morality
and economy provided a set of grounding metaphors for the
larger imagination of society in terms of a proportional aes-
thetic. The implication here is that the analytical categories
through which scholars conceive our sociology of knowl-
edge are given to us by a sociological imagination in which
“knowledge,” “society,” “value,” or “economy” stand as pro-
portionate objects for one another (Corsı´n Jime´nez 2007a).
In the case of Thompson’s famous conceptual pair—“moral
economy” and “political economy”—this is straightforward
and manifest in Thompson’s own sociological imagination:
The larger the slice of “political economy” in “society,” the
smaller that of “moral economy.” In the case of the so-
called knowledge economy, the occasion for this balancing
out is the confluence and intersection of the public nature
of knowledge and the political economy of science. In all
cases, the danger is to mistake “morality,” “technology,” or
“knowledge” for substantive sociological concepts, when all
that is at play here is a variant of a geometrically inspired,
supply-and-demand sociology. The moment this happens,
our sociological imagination is seriously compromised, be-
cause we can only imagine sociological knowledge through
the political philosophy and economy of market value, and
our sociology of knowledge becomes, inevitably, a sociology
of economic knowledge.
My concern in this article has been to explore the soci-
ological imagination of the knowledge economy from the
point of view of social and human scientists working at
Spain’s National Research Council, at a time when the coun-
cil faced an important reorganization of its activities aimed
at catching up with the knowledge society. Of course, not
all human scientists embraced the general epistemological
economy I have described here on their behalf. Many held
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views that could be described as roughly “managerial” and
were ferocious critics of their peers. However, the view of
the humanities as an antiquarian economy of knowledge
permeated the institution as a whole, was acknowledged,
if not actually self-consciously articulated, by many schol-
ars, and thus inflected the way human scientists related to
their own work. It is, therefore, in the context of this acute
self-consciousness about being seen to play in an antiquar-
ian economy of knowledge that I have attempted to show
how philologists and historians presented to themselves the
catching up with the knowledge economy, both in terms of
their own human capacities and labor and in the larger con-
text of institutional demands for a more dynamic and so-
cially responsive (some also say “responsible”) science.
I have attempted to show the difficulties and complexi-
ties that attend the activity of research, and I introduced two
ethnographic categories, “abduction” and “disproportion-
ality,” to illustrate how researchers imagined the routes and
movement of knowledge, especially the moments at which
knowledge collapses and stops. Abduction and dispropor-
tionality both point to researchers’ epistemological self-
consciousness about the limitations that always threaten
knowledge in its travails. They may be seen as ethnographic
expressions of what Hirokazu Miyazaki and Annelise Riles
(2005) have called the “endpoints” of failure. They are also,
in this sense, exemplars of how value obtains in a knowl-
edge economy whose sociology is not compromised by the
aesthetic of (socioeconomic) proportionality. They point to
what an anthropology of the sociology of knowledge might
look like when one does not fall in the trap of demonstrating
the rise of knowledge in economy and society.
There is perhaps a lesson to be learned here about the
relational economy of the new utopianism of knowledge.
As Maurizio Lazzarato and Antonio Negri (1991), among
others, have argued, the technological qualities of the new
knowledge economy contribute to hiding the collaborative
and cumulative nature of labor invested in the produc-
tion of knowledge, for it is knowledge in all its immate-
rial dimensions—in its very communicative process—that
is now taken as a productive figure (Lazzarato 1996).
Now, although the problem of the phantasmagoria of
machine intelligence is as old as the philosophy of machi-
nofacture, there is a sense that hyperlinkages and nonlin-
earity are making labor disappear in a radically novel way,
because it is connectivity–communication that is directly
producing the social relation of capital today (Lazzarato
2004). The matter is not trivial because, in the age of net-
work capitalism, the question of the production of knowl-
edge is most often posed in terms of ownership (McSherry
2001). Thus, the question of who owns capital appears in
this context as a question about the very ownership of so-
cial relationality, a capitalist appropriation, anthropologists
might say, of the (Melanesian) model of generative, produc-
tive knowledge (Strathern 1988). For this reason, critical le-
gal scholars and public-domain economists rightly argue
that, in the context of a network economy of information,
much is to be gained by keeping the economy open: by fos-
tering free access and promoting common-based peer pro-
duction (Benkler 2003; Benkler and Nissenbaum 2006). But
there is a danger to be encountered here in that the no-
tion of “relational connectivity” often involves conflating
and mistaking the productivity of knowledge with the pro-
duction (i.e., the labor) of knowledge, confusing knowledge
with scholarship and, thus, the demonstration of knowl-
edge (in economy and society) with its ethnographic ap-
pearance (monstration). In this context, some aspects of the
nature of knowledge may be better grasped if placed in the
context of their own negativity, if one asks of knowledge not
how it grows or what its conditions of production are but
how it disappears: what contributes to its absences and ab-
duction and how it confronts its own sense of diminishment
and disproportion.
Notes
1. The seminar, “La valorizacio´n de las ciencias humanas en
el CSIC,” was held at INGENIO, in Valencia, on March 13.
2. The term human sciences is used in CSIC to designate aca-
demic disciplines that, in the Anglo-Saxon context, are more of-
ten referred to as “humanities.” I use both terms interchangeably
throughout.
3. I have anonymized the names of all people, whether ethno-
graphic informants or those identified in institutional documents.
I give, however, complete archival references for all documents that
are in the public domain.
4. I employ aesthetic following Marilyn Strathern’s (1991:10)
and, more recently, Annelise Riles’s (2001) use of the term. In this
context, the word describes an institutional form, one that is at
once descriptive and analytic. Disproportionate, therefore, char-
acterizes both a personal experience and an institutional pattern.
Thus, insofar as talk of “disproportionality” folds the distance be-
tween the personal and the analytic, it becomes a formal device it-
self: “It claims to take into account both system and heterogeneity,
both models and real complexities at once” (Riles 2001:64).
5. That economic transactions produce externalities is some-
thing that economic analysis takes for granted. In economic analy-
sis, an externality is something external to a market transaction. For
example, pollution is an externality insofar as it is not something
that inheres in the cost structure of, say, mining operations. Michel
Callon (1998) has rightly argued that externalities are a matter of
“framing”: One decides what to frame and what not to frame, what
stays “inside” and what remains “outside” the analysis. Indeed, ex-
ternalities are also known as “spillovers” (Frischmann and Lemley
2006), things that flow over and outside the cost structure or frame-
work of the analysis (Callon says that they “overflow” the frame). It
is worth pointing out, however, that, as Strathern (2002) has noted,
talk of externalities externalizes scholars’ own sociology. Our tools
for making sense of the knowledge society are tools that remainder
their own sociology out: Patents, technology transfer protocols, or
(pseudo)republican models of Science–Society dialogues are all re-
maindering devices that work by redividing knowledge and society,
objectifying knowledge while simultaneously producing (knowl-
edge about) society. Hence, the current elusiveness of knowledge as
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a sociological category—and the image of our sociology of knowl-
edge as a sociology on knowledge (on patents, on collaboration, on
metrology, etc.).
6. The terms casposo and rancio have no equivalents in En-
glish. The semantic field in this context encompasses terms such
as conservative, backward, Francoist (reminiscent of the Franco
years), bureaucratic, or stagnant.
7. The human economy of knowledge that transpires in the
annotations that readers make in the margins of books has been
wonderfully described and commented on by Helen J. Jackson
(2001). What Jackson calls “marginalia” provide a clue to the rela-
tional depth of, in this case, philological scholarship. The difference
between the relational intensiveness of philology and the relational
extensiveness of the network economy of information might be an-
other way to characterize the sense of disproportionality that fur-
nishes researchers’ expectations toward the new knowledge econ-
omy. I thank one of the anonymous reviewers of the article for
bringing Jackson’s book to my attention.
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